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24 May 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy for Field Activities, OSA

SUBJECT : Communications Security During Tanker (KC-135)
Deployment

1. Several months ago [] addressed a memorandum to the Assistant Director which highlighted the possible compromise of the OXCART operation should communications procedures and the movement of tankers not conform with normal SAC operations. As a result of this memorandum, I was commissioned by the front office to coordinate OSA's efforts to ensure that the operations procedures employed in the movement of SAC tankers supporting an OXCART operation and their corresponding communication transmissions would blend into existing SAC procedures. Additionally, if our areas of operation extended to locales not presently within normal SAC tanker operations, then we were to investigate the possibility of establishing, as soon as possible, SAC operations in that area so that the presence of tankers in support of OXCART would not be a new and attention-getting exercise.

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2. During the past few months, sporadic meetings have been held on this subject and Operations Division in the personalities of [] have queried SAC seeking information regarding SAC bases utilizing KC-135 aircraft and their communication procedures throughout the world.

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3. On 22 May the limited information which we had received from SAC was reviewed and it was generally agreed that we did not at this time have sufficient information regarding SAC communication procedures, their single side band facilities throughout the world, and in addition, lacked the entree to acquire this information. Following the meeting, the paucity of information we now have was called to Colonel Ledford's attention and he agreed to approach SAC

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through Colonel Geary to arrange for a meeting of [] and an OXCART Operations Officer to visit SAC Headquarters and gain the information that is required. Once this information has been reviewed by this headquarters, it can then isolate those areas or procedures where compromise could take place, and we can then take steps with SAC to develop operating procedures which would prohibit the identification of an OXCART operation in the making.

4. Since the wherewithal for the continued investigation of this subject lies within Operations Division, Communications and Intel, it is suggested that this planning can most expeditiously and most properly take place as a function of your office. It is therefore requested that you assume responsibility of this task and the Programs Staff will withdraw.

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Chief, Programs Staff
(Special Activities)

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